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Abstract
Between 2015 and 2016, the Netherlands experienced an asylum crisis, one that directly affected organizations working
with refugee reception and integration. Besides civil society and governmental organizations (CSOs and GOs), the period
also saw individuals coming together to formemergent CSOs (ECSOs).We look at these organizations to determinewhether
their work brought a shift in Dutch practice and policy with regarding refugee reception. We also examine literature con-
cerning crisis governance, participatory spaces, and refugee reception governance. Finally, we investigate the views and
experiences of individuals from selected organizations that played an active role during the crisis. This explorative research
is based upon a qualitative and interpretative study involving panel discussions, document analysis, and interviews, con-
ducted between 2017 and 2018 by the Refugee Academy at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.We show circumstantial and
interorganizational elements that enhanced and hampered interactions between ECSOs, CSOs, and GOs. We argue that
shared activities during the crisis may have created possibilities for durable forms of collaboration and for the inclusion of
civil society groups in a debate mostly dominated by GOs.
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1. Introduction
Between 2015 and 2016, the relatively steep increase
in the arrival of asylum seekers in Europe affected the
ecology of organizations working with refugee recep-
tion. Organizations that, until then, were seemingly de-
tached from each other because of their differing aims
and missions came together and worked towards an effi-
cient reception of refugees. Simultaneously, citizens ob-
jecting to EU reception policies and citizens welcoming
refugees spontaneously organized themselves to assist
new arrivals (Boersma, Kraiukhina, Larruina, Lehota, &
Nury, 2018; Youkhana & Sutter, 2017). During this pe-
riod, European authorities failed to respond to the higher
number of individuals requesting asylumand the societal
discontent this caused. This situation was characterized
by a lack of clear legislation or coordination of efforts
among EU members (Boersma et al., 2018; Braun, 2017;
Feischmidt, Pries, & Cantat, 2019; Youkhana & Sutter,
2017). As Betts and Collier (2017) argue, the refugee re-
ception system was “broken”, full of weaknesses and in-
congruences and unable to manage increasing numbers
of refugees. What was called a “refugee crisis” was in
fact an asylum system crisis due to the inability to deal
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with refugees’ displacement and subsequent arrival in
Europe. Crisis governance literature shows that once a
situation is categorized as a crisis, it is treated as a situ-
ation that needs to be controlled (Van Buuren, Vink, &
Warner, 2016). The Netherlands received 44,970 asylum
applications in 2015 (up from 24,495 in 2014 and around
13,000 in 2012 and 2013), most of which concerned
refugees from Syria, Eritrea and Iraq (Eurostat, 2019).
This sudden inflow meant that emergency shelters and
asylum request processing facilities were urgently re-
quired (Boersma et al., 2018). The swift establishment of
temporary asylum seeker centres was soon followed by
public outcry in some areas. These circumstances gave
added importance to the contributions of civil society or-
ganizations (CSOs) already working in refugee reception,
especially since collaboration between them and govern-
mental organizations (GOs) was crucial for effective crisis
management (Boersma et al., 2018).
Crisis and disaster studies have acknowledged that
citizen volunteers play a major role during crises (Drabek
& McEntire, 2003; Dynes, 1994; Helsloot & Ruitenberg,
2004; Schmidt, Wolbers, Ferguson, & Boersma, 2017).
The importance of citizen involvement can be seenwhen
citizens converge to assist in damage assessment or pro-
vide general support to GOs (Kendra & Wachtendorf,
2003; Schmidt et al., 2017). The Disaster Research
Center differentiates four types of organizations: es-
tablished, expanding, extending, and emergent (Dynes,
1994; Schmidt et al., 2017). Established organizations are
traditional response organizations carry out their regu-
lar tasks (e.g., the army). Expanding organizations have
small permanent staffs who can mobilize large numbers
of volunteers when needed (e.g., the Red Cross). Extend-
ing organizations are those that perform tasks outside
their intended roles (e.g., church groups). Emergent orga-
nizations have an unsteady group of volunteers perform-
ing non-regular tasks or regular tasks in an improvised
manner. During the asylum crisis, emergent civil society
organizations (ECSOs) involved groups of individuals who
came together for a specific purpose because the estab-
lished CSOs were too formalized to provide support for
their particular concerns. These groups often gave rise to
new foundations or grass root organisations with small
financial aid from funds or local governments. Note that
in this article, “CSO” has twomeanings: when we discuss
GOs and CSOs together, it is an umbrella term with two
subcategories—established CSOs and emergent ECSOs;
however, when we discuss CSOs alone, it refers to estab-
lished CSOs only. The interaction between CSOs (the um-
brella term) and GOs is key to successful crisis manage-
ment and governance (Boersma et al., 2018; COA, 2017;
Drabek & McEntire, 2003; Jong & Ataç, 2017).
Across the EU, however, governmental responses to
the influx of refugees led to formal, top-down “command
and control” types of crisis management, with reduced
understandings of how to integrate the knowledge and
expertise of civil society actors into a coherent plan of
action (Boersma et al., 2018). The Dutch response was
no exception. In addition, the increase in refugee num-
bers accelerated a process that had been activated a
few years earlier. Before the crisis, the adverse effects
of the institutionalized reception of asylum seekers in
theNetherlandswere addressed in diverse academic and
policy papers (ACVZ, 2013; Larruina & Ghorashi, 2016;
Ten Holder, 2012; WRR, 2015). Many of these critical
works were acknowledged by official authorities, and
there was a consequent shift in public and policy dis-
cussions and in the actual reception and integration of
refugees. The main critique was that under the Cen-
tral Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA),
newcomers lacked early integration opportunities, and
the long waiting times and uncertainty caused further
stress to their already complex situations (ACVZ, 2013).
Debates began addressing the early inclusion and soci-
etal participation of asylum seekers and refugees, and
brought together CSOs and GOs as active contributors
(ACVZ, 2013; Ten Holder, 2012; WRR, 2015). We argue
that the increased flowof refugees during 2015 and 2016
had a direct impact on this growing public discourse pre-
cisely because it increased the profile of these organiza-
tions and introduced a multitude of new actors into the
field, mostly in the form of ECSOs.
Feischmidt et al. (2019, pp. 1–6) elaborate on the cri-
sis in Europe by outlining four characteristics that encap-
sulate the main features of this period and delineating
the current state of refugee reception. First, refugee ar-
rivals entered the European public discourse. Refugees
were in Europe, and they gave new insight into transna-
tional problems and challenges that until then had ap-
parently remained outside the continent. Second, civil
society emerged as a central actor in practically all Eu-
ropean countries (Pries, 2018). While it is well known
that organizations were active prior to the crisis, they
extended and adapted their missions during this period.
At the same time, other groups appeared and organized
themselves spontaneously (Youkhana & Sutter, 2017).
Third, the interplay between micro- and macro-level ac-
tivities increased, and it included network of organiza-
tions. These networks integrated personal involvement
with newmoral and politicalmobilizations and conducted
activities that ranged from local and small-scale assis-
tance to media appearances. Lastly, the asylum crisis was
a learning opportunity for all the involved actors. Individ-
uals who became active in assisting often entered a pro-
cess of politicization after learning about the broader con-
text of the crisis, but state authorities and organisations
also learned from their mutual positioning and interac-
tions (Pries, 2018). Civil society perceived state responses
to refugee arrivals as the outcome of failing refugee re-
ception systems, while states recognized the value of civil
society’s contributions (Boersma et al., 2018).
The asylum crisis caused polarized reactions in Eu-
ropean and Dutch society alike. Some were based on
public anxieties, while others stemmed from something
more promising in the dynamism of these new players
and initiatives. Alongside the more traditional and es-
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tablished actors in the field—municipalities, governmen-
tal agencies, established CSOs—many others acted: busi-
nesses, neighbourhood residents, social entrepreneurs,
and bottom-up socio-cultural initiatives (Jong & Ataç,
2017). Many of these initiatives were active in creating
opportunities for refugees andDutch people tomeet. For
example, there were alternative Dutch language teach-
ing programmes, mentoring schemes, and employment
projects (Rast & Ghorashi, 2018).
Roger Zetter (cited in Sigona, 2018 p. 456) argues
that in this era of globalization and forcedmigration, two
parallel processes are taking place: the proliferation of
bureaucratic categories that seek to encapsulate forced
displacement and the increasing precarity of the rights
and entitlements of displaced people. These processes
restrain refugees’ movements towards the Global North,
and to a certain extent, they also define and frame the as-
sistance that newly arrived refugees receive from both
civil society and governmental organizations (Sigona,
2018). As seen during the asylum crisis, the work of safe-
guarding refugees relies on civic involvement and organi-
zational networks (Feischmidt et al., 2019; Pries, 2018).
It is therefore particularly important to understand how
the rise of ECSOs and their interplay with established
CSOs altered the ecology of refugee reception during the
crisis. As Pries (2018) points out, there is a need to bet-
ter understand the patterns, but also the desirability, of
both horizontal and vertical cooperation between differ-
ent local groups, established NGOs, and state authorities
(that is, between ECSOs, CSOs, and GOs).
By examining the experiences and perceptions of in-
dividuals actively involved with these three types of or-
ganizations during the crisis, this study contributes to the
literature on crisis governance, collaborative governance,
and CSO participation (both established and emergent).
We use a crisis governance lens to call for greater atten-
tion to the emergent, bottom-up, and indeed, connective
actions ECSOs have with established CSOs and GOs. A cri-
sis governance lens enables us to give meaning to and to
understand the roles of informal networks, spontaneous
volunteers, and emergent organizations—in otherwords,
the ways that people organize themselves in times of
crisis when formal authorities fall short. After a theo-
retical discussion of crisis and collaborative governance
and participatory spaces, we provide a brief outline of
our methodological approach. Based on our qualitative
and interpretative study conducted in 2017–2018, we
address the following questions: what were the experi-
ences of ECSOs, CSOs, and GOs during the 2015–2016
asylum crisis? Did their cooperation help bring about a
more fundamental shift in Dutch refugee reception?
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Crisis Governance
Crises are disruptions to peace and order in society; they
manifest in diverse forms, from natural disasters and fi-
nancial system failures to dramatic changes in refugee
movements and numbers. According to Boin, ‘t Hart,
Stern and Sundelius (2016, p. 5), a crisis occurs when
“a social system, a community, an organization, a pol-
icy sector, a country…experiences an urgent threat to
its basic structures or fundamental values, which har-
bours many ‘unknowns’ and appears to require a far-
reaching response”. Crisis governance, then, concerns
how government works to control a perceived crisis
(Boin et al., 2016). It includes governments working to-
wards remediating a crisis but also towards enhancing
community resilience for future critical situations. Crisis
governance appears as a set of intertwined governance
challenges in which all the relevant organizations play
a role. During crises, ruling authorities often rely on in-
strumentation of the chaos, command, and control gov-
ernance model (Drabek & McEntire, 2003; Dynes, 1994;
Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004). However, in recent years,
that model has been weakened by the emergence of al-
ternative forms of cooperation among different parties,
and the emergence of advising institutions, all of which
has led to the continuity, coordination, cooperation cri-
sis management model. This model suggests that gov-
ernmental organizations should aim at solving the issues
that generated the crisis rather than avoiding those is-
sues, even if that means working through an initial pe-
riod of disorder or confusion (Drabek & McEntire, 2003;
Dynes, 1994; Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004). Doing so al-
lows governments to respond with greater flexibility and
inventiveness so they can adapt to the changing nature
of social and organizational dynamics during different
stages of a crisis. Effective responses, with synchronized
forms of preparation and improvisation, can be assured
by creating response structures that are ready to be trig-
gered when needed.
2.2. Collaborative Governance
Refugee reception in the Netherlands is an established
and highly institutionalized process (Geuijen, 1998;
Larruina & Ghorashi, 2016; Ten Holder, 2012). To clar-
ify whether the asylum crisis brought new opportuni-
ties to achieve durable collaboration between different
stakeholders in refugee reception, it is useful to examine
the concept collaborative governance. Theories of col-
laborative governance help to further conceptualize the
relation between ECSOs, CSOs, and GOs because they
provide elements for understanding the complexity of
interactions between heterogeneous stakeholders. Col-
laborative governance allows different organizations to
work together and agree on solutions while assisting pol-
icymakers and practitioners in targeting problems and
delivering action more effectively. According to Thomp-
son (as cited in Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 23), collab-
oration is an informal or formal process of negotiation
between independent actors. It enables the creation of
structures to define and manage their relationships and
how they act on the issue that brought them together. In
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the specific case of collaborative governance, it is a prac-
tice that brings multiple stakeholders together in spaces
where public agencies engage in a general agreement-
oriented and decision-making process (Ansell & Gash,
2008, pp. 543–544). Stoker (as cited in Ansell & Gash,
2008) refers to collaborative governance as the rules
around collective decision-making. Gray (1989, p. 5) ar-
gues that collaboration is a process in which actors who
have different perspectives on a problem can explore
their differences and seek answers that go beyond their
own interests and understandings. The asylum crisis cre-
ated a favourable environment for the formation of tem-
porary, emergent collaborations between ECSOs, CSOs,
andGOs. Burke andMorley (2016) note that where there
is a new and complex environment, temporary collab-
orations connecting different organizations to a shared
goal often prove to be effective (Burke & Morley, 2016).
However, such collaborations usually lack planning and
therefore tend to rely on spontaneous actions to coordi-
nate activities (Beck & Plowman, 2014, p. 1235). Emer-
gent collaboration appears in a context where organiza-
tions are under pressure to respond to conditions that
require contributions from multiple stakeholders (Beck
& Plowman, 2014, p. 1235). These collaborative arrange-
ments progress rapidly during critical situations, and the
interactions between actors develop organically through
the immediate exchange of information and resources.
2.3. CSOs and Participatory Spaces
To understand the role of CSOs in the broader context of
refugee reception and integration, it is important to note
their capacity to participate and the possible obstacles to
their participation in an environment mostly dominated
by GOs. According to Rast and Ghorashi (2018), refugee
reception through the active engagement of newcomers
in CSO activities offers a more inclusive approach than
that usually used by GOs. However, such initiatives face
numerous internal and external challenges that limit in-
clusive practices. For example, despite the proliferation
of new opportunities for citizen engagement in different
policy processes (Gaventa, 2006; Rast & Ghorashi, 2018),
participation alone does not always result in better inclu-
sion in a specific policy sector, in this case, that of mi-
grants and refugees. The development of CSOs’ role in
refugee reception appears to be in line with what is usu-
ally described as the Dutch participation society (RMO,
2013). However, community engagement is often seen
as a replacement for government action and funds (RMO,
2013; Skinner & Fleuret, 2011). In continental Europe,
government withdrawal has resulted in an increased em-
phasis on the responsibility of citizens—and voluntary
organizations, as the most direct expression of citizens’
commitment—without funding and/or assigning those
organizations the formal task of service delivery. In other
words, state reductions in welfare and social support
tend to be accompanied by policy discourses centred on
pluralism, citizen responsibility, and a celebration of the
synergy between the state, the private sector, and volun-
tary resources (Skinner & Fleuret, 2011).
Neoliberal policy studies have generatedmuch litera-
ture evaluating the risks and advantages of amore promi-
nent role for community engagement in social support
systems. The merits of community participation projects
include smaller-scale operations, more pluralized forms
of support, improved responsiveness to local needs, and
increased capacity to build, engage, and empower local
communities (Mitchell, 2001; Trudeau, 2008). However,
these virtues can be compromised when community en-
gagement becomes a tool of welfare support, leading
to the risk that CSOs become an arm of the state ap-
paratus (Hanlon, Rosenberg, & Clasby, 2007; Peeters &
Drosterij, 2011; Trommel, 2009). Cooperation assets that
are shared between CSOs and GOs should thus be orga-
nized to preserve CSOs’ capacities to act as spaces of re-
sistance, and to ensure “openness to alternative stand-
points and active incorporation of different, marginal-
ized voices from the periphery into a sector tradition-
ally dominated by society mainstream groups” (Wolch,
1999, p. 29). This requires a critical reconsideration of
participatory spaces and cooperative assets between
CSOs, and GOs, one that attends to questions of power
(Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998)
in its analysis of the relations between these groups
and stakeholders.
Gaventa (2006) elaborates on three types of par-
ticipatory spaces for citizen initiatives: closed spaces,
invited spaces, and created spaces. Closed spaces are
where decisions are taken by policymakers without in-
put from other stakeholders. Invited spaces constitute a
shift from closed to open spaces. Here other stakehold-
ers are invited to take part and contribute their views.
Created spaces are devised by those with less power or
influence over a particular issue. Cornwall (2002, p. 17)
refers to created spaces as “spaces that emerge more or-
ganically out of sets of common concerns or identifica-
tions….These may be ‘sites of radical possibility’ where
those who are excluded find a place and a voice”. The
interplay between closed, invited, and created spaces
presents challenges to the interactions between ECSOs,
CSOs, and GOs. To contest closed spaces, ECSOs and
CSOs may demand greater transparency and account-
ability, as well as more democratic structures (Gaventa,
2006). Invited spaces might require that these organiza-
tions negotiate and collaboratewhile seeking a degree of
independence. However, they should be able to decide
when to enter and leave such spaces, which would pre-
serve their capacity to operate in different spaces and
generate change in each.
Both crisis and collaborative governance provide ele-
ments to understand the relations between ECSOs, CSOs,
and GOs. Collaborative governance allows different or-
ganizations to work together on specific problems while
assisting policymakers and practitioners. Similarly, the
interaction between different participatory spaces puts
questions of power at the heart of any engagement be-
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tween CSOs and GOs (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Hardy &
Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998). Thus, it is important to reflect on
the experiences of ECSOs, CSOs, and GOs during the asy-
lum crisis in order to see if those engagements brought a
change in dynamics between organizations dealing with
refugee reception.
Crisis governance employs a multi-actor perspective
to study crisis preparation, prevention, response, recov-
ery, and accountability. It also studies the role that cit-
izens and new technologies can play in different crisis
phases (Drabek &McEntire, 2003; Dynes, 1994; Helsloot
& Ruitenberg, 2004). Furthermore, participation as joint
consultations or practices through which different actors
can contribute to crisis remediation is an important angle
for studying the dynamics between different organiza-
tional actors. Such participation opportunities give space
for more pluralized forms of support and the capacity to
build, engage, and empower local communities (Mitchell,
2001; Trudeau, 2008).
3. Research Approach and Methods
This article is drawn from a case study involving indi-
viduals from ECSOs, CSOs, and GOs taking part in re-
search activities at the Refugee Academy, a part of the
Institute for Societal Resilience at the Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam. The study’s objectives were to identify crisis
response practices that could be applied to the asylum
crisis and other crisis situations and to determine if those
responses would contribute to a more fundamental
shift in Dutch refugee reception. As exploratory research
conducted within the academy’s Refugee Crisis Gover-
nance research stream, the project was based primarily
on qualitative and interpretative methods (Denscombe,
2014; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2015). These included
the analysis of data from two meetings with panel dis-
cussions, twelve semi-structured follow-up interviews,
and document analysis (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). Panel
discussions allowed us to bring in different actors with
extensive knowledge and expertise on the asylum cri-
sis. Semi-structured interviews offered informants a re-
laxed and personalized approach, which provided flexi-
bility in how discussion topics were introduced. Lastly,
document analysis enabled the contextualization and tri-
angulation of our research (Bowen, 2009). We corrob-
orated findings by analysing data collected through dif-
ferent methods. In June 2017, during its first meeting,
the Refugee Academy organized a roundtable on the gov-
ernance of the 2015–2016 asylum crisis. It was moder-
ated by one of this article’s authors, an expert in crisis
governance and organization sciences. Of the nine other
participants, two were from different local governments,
three from other universities, two from ECSOs, and two
from CSOs. In November 2017, another meeting on cri-
sis governance was organized. It had a panel with indi-
viduals from three ECSOs, two CSOs, and two GOs and
was moderated by one of the authors. During February–
March 2018, follow-up interviews were arranged with
relevant interviewees identified through contacts from
the Refugee Academy. We created a list of 45 potential
respondents based on their organizations and roles dur-
ing the crisis. Of these, 15 individuals did not reply, 18 did
not see enough connection between their work and the
potential interviews, and 12 agreed to be interviewed.
However, these 12 were mainly from CSOs and, of those,
mostly ECSOs. While GO respondents were open to dis-
cussing their experiences during the crisis in the first
Refugee Academy meeting (in June 2017), by the sec-
ond meeting four months later, they proved harder to at-
tract. By January–March 2018, none of our GO contacts,
including those who had taken part in previous activi-
ties, were willing to be interviewed. Paradoxically, many
of these organizations were still eager to contribute to
other activities organized by our research group, just not
those activities concerned with the asylum crisis and re-
lated questions. The interviews were conducted in Dutch
and followed an interview guide created to consider the
operationalization of the central concepts of this study.
The aim was to identify recurring topics and develop an
overview of the different perceptions, views, and opin-
ions. To systematize and analyse the data gathered, we
used the grounded theory approach, which allows the-
ory to be developed from the data, instead of the op-
posite. This inductive method (e.g., from the specific to
the general) guided rather than determined our analysis
(Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). The interviews were
transcribed and translated into English by native Dutch
speakers. The empirical findings are based on selected
quotes from themeeting reports and the interviews that
show common patterns, topics, and subjects.
4. Results
4.1. Setting the Scene: Dutch Refugee Reception during
the Crisis
Whether emergent or established, CSOs assist refugees
through advocacy, the provision of extra services, and
the help of volunteers (Fleischmann & Steinhilper, 2017).
They may include experts who can act to represent the
interests of refugees without the regulatory constraints
of GOs. CSOs can provide a degree of flexibility and
adaptability that GOs cannot. Moreover, these organi-
zations play a key role in refugee reception and inte-
gration because they assist refugees after their arrival
(Garkisch, Heidingsfelder, & Beckmann, 2017). Not only
do CSOs adapt to immediate refugee needs and possibili-
ties, but they play a useful role in connecting refugees to
other relevant individuals and organizations. CSOs aim
to be a bridge, a link between their experiences and
futures in the host society (Fleischmann & Steinhilper,
2017; Larruina & Ghorashi, 2016; Rast & Ghorashi, 2018).
During the crisis, ECSOs supported or interacted with
CSOs such as the Dutch Council for Refugees or the Red
Cross (Boersma et al., 2018). Some ECSOs collected do-
nations and sent aid packages to Greece and other Euro-
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pean countries. Other organizations focused on improv-
ing refugees’ integration in local communities, greeting
and assisting refugeeswhen they arrived in town, or facil-
itating temporary stays for refugees with Dutch host fam-
ilies. Some other ECSOs provided community housing
or opportunities for encounter and connection with the
neighbourhood, both in physical spaces and through on-
line communities. The key Dutch GOs involved were the
COA, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND),
and the local governments.
CSOs were asked to assist GOs with the reception of
refugees during the crisis. Starting in September 2015,
the accommodation of asylum seekers took place in new
locations because the COA’s centres lacked the capac-
ity (Boersma et al., 2018). Though the law stated that
applicants should receive a decision on their residency
status within six months, the time to complete the pro-
cess was prolonged during the crisis, and refugees had
to be accommodated in temporary reception centres. In
Amsterdam, the city government set up four emergency
shelters and requested assistance from the Salvation
Army. By April 2016, the COA had increased its capac-
ity, and it took over management of all the Amsterdam
shelters (Boersma et al., 2018). Finally, in May 2017,
the COA announced that its operations would be re-
duced due to lower occupancy and expectations for re-
duced refugee inflow in the future (COA, 2017). However,
while some initiatives were scaling down, other stake-
holders expressed less certainty about future refugee
numbers. This was clearly expressed by COA chairman
Gerard Bakker, who spoke of both the experience of
community groups and the need to remain ready for fu-
ture developments:
We learned a lot from each other, and therefore we
became locally involved in this movement, with cities,
volunteers, and locals. We will not just close the door
behind us, because we will need each other again if
the number of asylum seekers grows again unexpect-
edly. (COA, 2017; authors’ translation)
Additionally, the Advisory Committee on Migration
Affair’s (ACVZ, 2018) work plan for 2017 focused onwhat
the Dutch Minister of Justice called “Migration Manage-
ment 2030”. Indeed, authorities remained concerned
about future migration and sought advice on how to de-
velop a stable long-termmigration system that would as-
sist them in planning their work and services accordingly.
4.2. Circumstantial Elements and Crisis Governance
Our findings reveal circumstantial (specific to an organi-
zation’s context) and interorganizational elements that
played a crucial role in the work of ECSOs, CSOs, and GOs
during the crisis. It is clear that their experiences require
a shift in our attention to what we call meso- and micro-
level organizational dynamics.
4.2.1. Location and Anticipation
During the Refugee Academy meetings, participants
from ECSOs, CSOs, and GOs discussed their impressions
and experiences of the asylum crisis. This was one of
the few opportunities they had to talk about the topic
with people from other organizations. Their shared im-
pressions related to the predictability of the crisis and its
perception as mostly an urban experience:
What was striking was that there was a lot of talking
about the crisis, while I was thinking by [sic] myself, if
we have a crisis, it is a crisis of organizations and how
we fix things and inwhatwaywe are prepared and not
prepared to [sic] things that, from my view, we could
have seen coming. (Respondent 6, interview)
The crisis did not come as a surprise to most respon-
dents. In fact, they noted several conditions that were
present before the increase in refugee arrivals, and they
had foreseen subsequent developments and implica-
tions. This foreknowledge made respondents critical of
the actual refugee crisis, but many agreed that although
the handling of the crisis was clearly unfortunate, it had,
nonetheless, brought positive outcomes. Some said the
crisis was a “blessing in disguise” (ISR, 2017a). This was
clearly realized by the coming together of independent
individuals and local initiatives that otherwise would
have never interacted.
4.2.2. Assessment of Needs and Definition of Roles
Respondents representing CSOs that had been present in
Dutch society for a few years reflected on the impact of
events portrayed in the media and the subsequent surge
in calls to inquire about volunteering opportunities. This
hindered the already overburdened workload of estab-
lished organizations. At times, it created new obstacles
or contradictory situations:
Certain events portrayed in the media stirred public
opinion and helped to increase the numbers of volun-
teerswilling to help established local community orga-
nizations and projects, or in the launch of new initia-
tives. Established NGOs/charity organizations [CSOs]
sometimes viewed the sudden increase in new volun-
teers and initiatives [ECSOs] as interfering with their
work. (ISR, 2017b)
During the roundtables, participants spoke of their frus-
tration with the lack of resources not only for receiving
refugees but for integrating them into the community as
soon as possible. They often elaborated on their roles
during the crisis, but they also discussed how they might
address this issue:
For all organizations, it is important to know how to
give help, but also to provide refugees with the re-
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sources for self-help wherever possible. To achieve
the latter, it is essential to recognize what abilities
people already have and build on them. This re-
minds workers, in turn, to listen to refugees—their
views, experiences, and contributions—as a means of
making refugee reception more just and sustainable.
(ISR, 2017a)
All respondents noted the importance of achieving a gen-
uine understanding of refugee needs rather than mak-
ing assumptions that do not include the perspectives of
refugees themselves. Many felt that the involvement of
new actors—ECSOs—would facilitate better communica-
tion with refugees and, therefore, better needs assess-
ments. This might be achieved by bringing together like-
minded organizations and individuals to enhance learn-
ing and cooperation activities:
Many participants noted that we often tend to or-
ganize initiatives for refugees rather than with them.
We need a great deal more reflection on this. It is
time to see part of our work as listening to and in-
volving refugees in our discussions, decisions, and
projects. All participants agreed [ECSOs, CSOs, and
GOs]. (ISR, 2017b)
In the report from the second meeting (ISR, 2017b),
there is a clear realization that organizational and individ-
ual learning processes should involve not only the host
society but refugees themselves, and as soon as they ar-
rive. The concept of co-ownership may prove interest-
ing in this context, insofar as it suggests a shift from
providing help by just giving to providing help by ask-
ing what is needed. In other words, there is a growing
understanding that reception and integration are two-
way processes.
4.3. Interorganizational Elements: Opportunities for
Collaborative Governance?
4.3.1. Working Separately to Achieve Similar Aims
When askedwhat the organizations had experienced dur-
ing the crisis in relation to other stakeholders, partici-
pants recognized that GOs interacted with and learned
from thework and practices of ECSOs, CSOs, or other gov-
ernmental counterparts:
Governmental organizations learned a great deal by
going into the field and working with initiatives and
municipalities. This is a process that had started be-
fore the refugee crisis, but it was developed further
and faster during this period.On theother hand, there
was evidence that the good intentions of local govern-
ments can sometimes produce unintended (negative)
results. For instance, the actions of municipalities of-
ten foment competition and/or conflict between ini-
tiatives [mostly ECSOs]. (ISR, 2017b)
Though GOs and CSOs had started coming together be-
fore the 2015–2016 period, this process accelerated
during the asylum crisis. Paradoxically, this sometimes-
produced unintended consequences, as the previous ex-
ample indicates. By funding new projects, local govern-
ments sometimes stimulated competition between dif-
ferent initiatives.
The respondents emphasized not only the contact be-
tween different types of organizations (GO and CSO), but
also the interactions between organizations belonging to
the same sector (CSO–CSO or GO–GO). In the following
example, we see evidence of strained relations between
established and emergent CSOs:
There appeared to be little recognition of the long ex-
perience and knowledge built within the NGOs them-
selves. For that reason, it is crucial to rethink and re-
design the relations between established NGOs, like
Vluchtelingenwerk [Dutch Council for Refugees], and
more “fluid” community initiatives [ECSOs] so that the
positive potential of the latter is realized and intercon-
nected with the experience of the first. (ISR, 2017b)
Where lines of communication between CSOs and GOs
were inadequate, collaborative efforts sometimes suf-
fered or ended in conflict. One respondent described a
lack of support from relevant organizations and the bu-
reaucratic rules that obstructed clear communication:
Sometimes therewas a clear guideline communicated
from the national organizations to the local ones.
Then there is someone you know and that you can
call. But the bureaucracywas very burdensome; there
is someone behind a desk who says, “Rules are rules”.
(ECSO Respondent 3, interview)
Our research shows that where horizontal cooperation
and collaboration occurred, experienced organizations
could assist the less experienced in establishing them-
selves and launching their programmes.
4.4. Opportunities for Change through ECSO and CSO
Participation
Although the circumstantial and interorganizational ev-
idence show elements that limited the work of CSOs
and GOs, the Refugee Academy meetings and the in-
terviews indicate the beginning of a shift towards en-
abling CSOs’ inclusion in an organizational ecosystem
composed mostly of GOs. This change is seen mainly in
the sharing of best practices and the focusing on local
rather than central governments.
4.4.1. Opportunities for Change at the Meso-Level:
Unexpected Partners and Local Governments
Respondents acknowledged that the asylum crisis pre-
sented an opportunity to rethink approaches to refugee
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reception. They highlighted the importance of under-
standing the need for different organizational roles as
part of a larger set of stakeholders and processes. This
could be applied to the relation between homogenous or
heterogeneous organizations (i.e., the interplay among
organizations belonging to the same or different sec-
tors) but also to the relationship between organizations
and refugees:
First, this opportunity [the asylum crisis] brought
onto the organizational stage local and private initia-
tives [ECSOs] dealing with different issues regarding
refugees. Second, municipalities are more involved in
refugee reception than before; they are taking respon-
sibility and initiative. These elements are generating
the conditions for a larger shift in thinking about the
meaning and effects of greater public participation.
(ISR, 2017a)
Many of the interviews stressed the relevance of estab-
lishing and sustaining a good relationship with local gov-
ernments, often noting that the relatively small size of
the municipalities allowed them to interact and obtain
immediate answers to their needs and requests:
Yes, in some municipalities it is a bit easier because
they are smaller. That makes it easy to get to them,
to reach them. Everything I say isn’t about my interac-
tion, but what I see in the field. I have a pretty good re-
lationship with the municipality….They are also open
to processes and new things. (CSO Respondent 5,
interview)
Regarding the specific actions taken during the crisis, par-
ticipants mostly agreed that traditional decision chan-
nels should be modified, from being top-down to being
bottom-up. Both Refugee Academymeeting reports also
acknowledged the necessity of collaborative spaces and
a better definition of roles, which might clarify respon-
sibilities and help to draw an organizational map show-
ing all the relevant stakeholders and their relation to one
another. In this context, most respondents defined their
roles by focusing on what could have been done bet-
ter and in what manner. The interorganizational connec-
tions that emerged during the asylum crisis were central,
and participants identified three conditions required to
facilitate those connections: focusing on positive people,
having a can-do attitude, and local governments assum-
ing a coordinating role.
4.4.2. Opportunities for Change at the Micro-Level:
Human Capital and Tailored Actions
While acknowledging the conditions required to facili-
tate governance and share best practices, respondents
elaborated on how this could start at the micro-level.
They particularly emphasized the importance of personal
alliances. One respondent felt that, despite the differ-
ences between organizations, all stakeholders should fo-
cus on connections between individuals or groups that
work well together and pursue the same goals:
Regardless of the (type) of organization, there are al-
ways people you can connect with, who can make a
difference.Working together towards an inclusive sys-
tem boils down to finding those people and keeping
in touch with the network one establishes. We should
invest in creating structures in which people can find
each other and build durable networks. (ISR, 2017b)
Moreover, many respondents recognized the benefit of
tailoring their actions to specific situations rather than
following a generic procedure. Others underlined the
importance of networking to seek solutions to prob-
lems or possible points of collaboration. One respon-
dent highlighted the importance of personal contacts
not only to facilitate their work but to connect refugees
with the larger host society. As another individual ob-
served, “networks” might refer to other organizations or
to individual volunteers. Some networks might even in-
clude employees from GOs. However, active collabora-
tion with GOs proved more elusive due to their bureau-
cratic challenges:
If you don’t know how to find each other, a lot of time
and energy will be lost….If you are all doing the same
thing and you don’t know it. You need some sort of
coordination, and you have to find each other. (ECSO
Respondent 11, interview)
Our research shows that to obtain a quick answer or solu-
tion to a problem, respondents regularly used their net-
works to reach the right person in the relevant organiza-
tion. Despite, or perhaps because of, these informal tac-
tics, such contact often led to greater collaboration and
more positive outcomes.
While these reports and interview fragments present
patterns observed in a specific setting, they have much
to tell us about how ECSOs, CSOs, and GOs interacted
during the asylum crisis and what their reflections and
considerations reveal about the larger Dutch response.
Our evidence suggests that these interactions hold the
potential for future collaboration and, more specifically,
for more inclusive practices regarding CSOs. The impli-
cations for refugee reception and organizational ecology
are addressed in the next section.
5. Conclusion
This research examined the differing roles and experi-
ences of ECSOs, CSOs, and GOs during the Dutch asy-
lum crisis. Our data shows that the coming together
of these organizations may mark the beginning of a
shift that enables the inclusion of ECSOs and CSOs in
an organizational ecosystem that before the crisis, was
mostly dominated by GOs. This change occurred mainly
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because of a focus on local rather than central govern-
ment initiatives and because stakeholders sought to net-
work, collaborate, and share best practices. The crisis
provided an opportunity to reconsider the challenges
of refugee reception, where the participation of ECSOs,
CSOs, and refugees themselves could be invited and ac-
tively encouraged.	
From a crisis management perspective, understand-
ing the contributions of ECSOs and CSOs could assist
GOs in moving away from the command-and-control ap-
proach to crisis and towards better planned and coor-
dinated practices. In a crisis management model that
favours coordination, new opportunities for collabora-
tion and resource optimization between ECSOs, CSOs,
and GOswould be possible (Boersma et al., 2018; Drabek
& McEntire, 2003). This could enable interactions be-
tween heterogeneous stakeholders while making the
most of their human, social, and logistical resources. Al-
though incorporating new actors can sometimes hamper
the work of established actors, a well-supported plan
of action/interaction could help mitigate early difficul-
ties, with much to be gained as actors learn to work to-
gether. Therefore, it is arguable that after a crisis, or in-
deed during any non-crisis period, there is an opportu-
nity to put inclusive and collaborative relations (Rast &
Ghorashi, 2018) into place in anticipation of future needs.
What we can say with certainty is that the asylum crisis
brought a new awareness of the importance of collabo-
rative assets.
More specifically, our empirical findings suggest real
possibilities for CSOs and local GOs to work together.
This could be achieved in part because municipalities
are smaller and less bureaucratic than the central gov-
ernment, often making it quicker and easier for ECSOs
and CSOs to access decision makers and resources. In-
deed, many respondents described micro-level interac-
tions that focused on, and reinforced, contacts and re-
lations in local government as well as other commu-
nity agencies.
Turning to the broad issue of participation, the asy-
lum crisis created “closed spaces” where only govern-
mental organizations, such as the COA and the munici-
palities, were involved (Boersma et al., 2018). These be-
came “invited spaces” once CSOs were asked to assist.
However, while the promise to leave that “invited space”
open for future interactions was clearly expressed in the
2017 COA statement and in the Refugee Academy meet-
ing it seems that the perception of ongoing collaboration
was not shared by all.
As our study indicates, there are opportunities for col-
laboration among ECSOs, CSOs, and GOs during both cri-
sis and non-crisis periods. Such collaborative governance
could offer the possibility of shared spaces to exchange
best practices on a long-term basis, one that could foster
a sustainable form of refugee reception and integration
by contributing to policy changes and best practice guide-
lines. However, these opportunities are weakened by
seemingly divergent organizational priorities. This gives
added urgency to the need for civil society and govern-
ments to work together during non-crisis periods so they
can be ready for any future asylum crisis.
Future research needs to determine to what extent
our findings apply to other policy sectors and/or stages of
a (asylum) crisis. In addition, because of the differences
between ECSOs, CSOs, and GOs, research should allow
for the fact that each may present differently depend-
ing upon whether it is considered separately or with the
others. In other words, considering them together may
mask internal or external factors that might otherwise
be visible. With that caveat, we argue that by examin-
ing micro- and meso-level opportunities between ECSO,
CSOs, and GOs, it is possible to identify the conditions
for a change in Dutch refugee reception. This change can
be contextualized in an organizational ecology that in-
cludes the effort and commitment of individuals, most of
whom share a desire to assist refugees without bureau-
cratic constraints. Their work and indeed this research
are made more important because they coincide with
current and highly polarized public debates about the re-
ception and inclusion of refugees.
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